Bolivian government officials have said that they are optimistic about receiving recognition from the United States for its anti-drug efforts, which may lead to a renewal of the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA). The agreement gave Bolivia greater duty-free access to US markets in an effort to provide alternatives to drug producers. (AdelaideNow)

BOLIVIA is moderately optimistic it will win an extension of United States trade preferences that are conditioned on fighting cocaine production because it is boosting anti-drug efforts, the country's vice president said today.

Alvaro Garcia Linera told Reuters in an interview that he presented an update on Bolivia's drug fight to State Department officials, including the top U.S. diplomat for Latin America, Thomas Shannon, on Monday.

The fight against drugs is one of the central points in the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, or ATPDEA, which is due to expire at the end of the year. The program gives top cocaine-producing countries in South America expanded duty-free access to the United States in an effort to boost their legal industry and job opportunities.

If it is not renewed, Bolivia – the world's third-largest producer of cocaine – will face higher tariffs on its exports to the United States.

"We stay moderately optimistic about the extension of the trade preference," Garcia Linera said in the interview.

"The new strategy of the (drug) fight is the intensification of prohibition, better control of the borders to prevent the entry of acids and components to prepare the drug and more police raids," he said in Washington, where he is on his second visit in two months.

He emphasized that Bolivia wants to improve relations with the United States on all levels.

Garcia Linera said the numbers prove that Bolivia is doing its job in the cocaine battle.

He said Bolivia is eradicating 25ha to 27ha of coca a day, up from 5ha a day earlier this year, and will wipe out 5200ha this year, meeting its commitment to the United States.

Colombia, Ecuador and Peru also receive benefits under the Andean program, which could expire in December if the U.S. Congress does not approve their extension.

Peru and Colombia are also waiting for Congress to ratify free trade agreements negotiated with the United States, which would end the benefits.

Drug tests
Alcohol tests
Ovulation tests

Samuel Doria Medina's — the richest man in Bolivia — officially left MIR (Movimiento Izquierdista Revolucionario) after 17 years, citing his objections to the party's participation in Goni's government. Of course, Doria Medina's rivalry w/ MIR chief, Jaime Paz Zamora, has been long & complicated. W/ most "traditional" parties in disarray (especially MNR & MIR) after October, many predicted Doria Medina's break w/ MIR — his public participation in a hunger strike along w/ other public figures/celebrities in October was a clear indication.

So. W/ much fanfare, Doria Medina officially formed a new political party — Frente de Unidad Nacional (FUN) — on Friday. Nation-wide municipal elections are less than a year away. And Doria Medina's a multi-millionaire. But despite his one-hour speech at the party's founding, the party's ideological platform was left unclear. There's widespread skepticism that this'll be yet another personalist, populist party.

DATOSs (Bolivia's US News & World Report) recently ran lengthy interviews w/ Doria Medina (published before launching his new party), Tuto Quiroga, and Juan Carlos Durсn. All three players are back in the political arena in the post-October realignment.

Jorge Quiroga Ramirez (aka Tuto Quiroga) was vice-president, until Banzer stepped down a year early (2001) due to health reasons. After a carefully managed re-entry into the country following the October revolt, Tuto began making his presence felt in the media. It's unclear whether he'll also form a new party or try to rebuild the shattered remains of ADN (Acciѓn Democrсtica Nationalista) — which polled less than 5% of the 2002 vote.

In the late 1990s, ADN split into two factions: the dinosaurios (the old guard) and the pitufos (the young turks). Banzer, who'd retired from political life after several unsuccessful presidential campaigns, returned to restore order and run as ADN's presidential candidate in 1997. Tuto Quiroga (a pitufo) was there to "balance the ticket."

Accused by Doria Medina of being "more rightwing than Bush", the mild-mannered Tuto Quiroga's a 21st century technocrat who believes, on the whole, in neoliberal economics. In his rhetoric, however, Tuto has more in common w/ center-right European proponents of "capitalism w/ a human face". Early October polls showed Tuto the most popular Bolivian political figure.

Juan Carlos Durсn, on the other hand, clearly wants to rebuild his party, MNR (Movimiento Nationalista Revolucionario). He argues that Goni's principal mistake was transforming MNR into a party of encorbatados, a middle-class "tie-wearing" organization. Durсn, a popular ex-mayor of Santa Cruz (Bolivia's largest city) argues that MNR should focus on competing for the electoral space occupied by Evo Morales' MAS, engaging in a direct debate. He also places much of the blame for the October crisis on Tuto, claiming his presidency contributed to the economic crisis that fueled the 2003 political meltdown.

Ironically, the MNR (Goni's party) has the best chance of surviving. Not only is MNR the oldest party, but most analysts have long considered it the most modern, programatic, institutionalized, and disciplined party. Along w/ the unpopular Executive Decree 21060 (the foundation for the nation's neoliberal economy since 1985), the MNR's also responsible for such progressive reforms as the Law of Popular Participation (which created municipal elections) and the Bonosol (a nationwide pension fund for the elderly). The MNR still retains strong support in the country's oriental provinces — especially Santa Cruz & Tarija — the economic "engines" of the country. Few forget the cruceёa deputy, Roxana Sandoval, boldly standing in parliament, rejecting Goni's resignation, and proclaiming "God save us from these narco-terrorists!" while staring across the aisle at Filemon Escobar.

The post-October political landscape's clearly uncertain. The Bolivian party system's taken a tremendous beating (especially the traditional "systemic" parties). The lack, for too long, of the links between political parties & civil society necessary to produce a public sense of representativeness & legitimacy were clear. Disdain for "crooked politicians" is a worldwide phenomenon. But it acutely increased in Bolivia for years. Worse yet, the parties did little change that image. That has to change. And soon. After all, liberal, representative democracy is impossible w/o political parties.

The two worker's syndicates involved in Bolivia's October revolt — Jaime Solares' COB and Roberto de la Cruz' COR — are threatening to close the national parliament. They're opposed to the return of ex-ministers (Goni's cabinet) to the legislature.

Unlike most presidential systems (but like most parliamentary ones) the Bolivian cabinet is often chosen from the legislature. It's a common mistake to analyze Bolivia's political system from the perspective that it's a presidential system. The only thing Bolivia's institutional design doesn't have in common w/ most parliamentary systems is that parliament can't call for vote of no confidence and the executive can't dissolve the legislature to call for early elections. Hence, there's the potential problem of "what if" Goni decides to return to parliament himself (he was, after all, elected as a senator at the head of his party's electoral list).

Likewise, many ex-ministers were elected to the Senate and House of Deputies in 2002. Legally, they're entitled to return to their seats once their functions as ministers are ended (until then, suplentes occupy their seats). It's not uncommon for Bolivian presidents to dismiss cabinet ministers, who then return to their parliamentary seats. Regardless of their participation in an unpopular government, these men & women were elected to parliament and have a right to exercise their functions in their respective chambers, unless sanctioned by some due process (legal proceedings against Goni & his cabinet are still in process, as are legal proceedings against the uprising's other protagonists).

Interestingly, Evo Morales and MAS have opposed the COB-COR strategy, which marks an important contrast (and perhaps Evo's much-hoped-for evolution?). He and his spokespersons announced that MAS supports the democratic system and "will arrive in the seat of power via elections." The fear is that if popular protests are unleashed again, a military coup could easy follow.

Meanwhile, the Bolivian anti-drug police (FELCN) today discovered a cache of weapons en route from Santa Cruz to Villamontes. The weapons were sophisticated, including FAL & AUG assault rifles, as well as anti-tank munition. It's unclear whether the weapons were to be used by subversive groups in the country (e.g. cocaleros) or if they were en route to Paraguay, an area of heavy al-Qaeda activity for years.

Part of the Bolivian government's new gas & oil plan was finally unveiled today. And, yes, it's pretty much the same as what Goni's plan proposed. After international gas & oil exports pronounced the obvious — that Bolivia can't afford to industrialize its gas reserves (something that's very capital and technology intensive, two things which Bolivia lacks) and that it's internal market wouldn't justify the cost (since there are so few Bolivians) and let's not forget that few companies are interested in investing in such a high-risk market (since the October uprising raised the threat of nationalization) — the government pronounced that the export of gas was, after all, the most viable alternative. Now Mesa's government announced that the taxes on gas & oil companies will go up from 18% to a reasonable 26% (not the 50% demanded by some). So, essentially, the so-called guerra del gas produced no significant results, beyond crushing the fragile tourist industry and raising the risk for international investment.

Meanwhile, the erradication of coca in the Chapare (and now also Yungas) continues, w/ Mesa slowly taking a firmer stance against the rising death toll among the police & military. Likewise, the war against corruption still shows no significant results. And parliament's still mired, unable to vote for a new Defensor del Pueblo. Plus, no one has any idea what the "referendum on gas" will ever look like (debates on question wording continue) or if it'll ever be more than just a public rubber stamp. However, thanks to Venezuela's Hugo Chavez (who may soon be out of power), nationalist rhetoric against Chile continues (which always gives Bolivians something exterior to focus on). All this while the exchange rate slowly creeps up to Bs. 7.78 to the $US (when I arrived, it was Bs. 7.71).

So. As the holiday season quickly approaches, Bolivian politics has gone back to the same old, same old. Perhaps this gives credence to Quispe's anger that this is "la misma chola con otra pollera". But. When a country's bankrupt, it really doesn't have many options, does it?

All the information available so far seems to come from release of ABI (the Bolivian government's press agency). It indicates that 16 Muslim people from Bangladesh -that's not the same country as Pakistan, Crónica!- have been arrested following a tip by French authorities that they could be implicated in a (presumptive) plan to hijack a plane in the La Paz-Santa Cruz-Buenos Aires route and direct it against US targets (most likely, I presume, in Buenos Aires). You can read about these reports in Reuters Alertnet (other articles, like Wired's, are just rehashings of Reuter's somewhat skeptical notice of the ABI press release).

As in most cases where (presumed) links to terrorism are present, there are more assumptions, maybes and coulds than hard data. We'll have to see how this develops.

---

As an aside unrelated to the story itself, let it be noted that, as far as I can tell, Southern Exposure put the story online well before Reuters did. That's (part of) what this "New Media" thing is about, not online newspapers with pop-up advertising...

Bolivian politics is usually rather odd. The last few months, of course, that's taken on greater proportions. A president was toppled, after all, in a populist coup. Now there's a popular joke about the new president, Carlos Mesa. Why is Mesa like Carnaval? Because you're not sure if he falls in February or March.

In two months, Mesa's gone from distant academic to populist to constitutional democrat. Immediately after taking power, Mesa decided to say "yes" to all the popular demands, but asked for time to consider all requests. At first this was troubling, he overly encouraged many of the populist dirigentes, who took full advantage of this to increase their pressure for such demands as 1,000 free tractors, shorter school years, indemnity for all who died in the guerra del gas, immediate land grants, nationalization of the oil & gas industry, legalization of coca, elimination of the tax code, etc.

Just over a week ago, Mesa decided to (using a Bolivian expression) "put his pants on" and start negotiating w/in the framework of the constitution. If Quispe wants to call his ministers "bitches" and walk out on meetings before they even begin, then he won't deal w/ Quispe anymore. Things like that.

Since Mesa took office, two police officers were killed and almost a dozen wounded by land mines in the Chapare (where Evo's followers grow coca). While Bolivia's human rights organizations never denounce these acts (which leads to their lack of credibility among much of the population), Mesa finally declared those acts (along w/ the torturing & killing of campesinos who choose not to grow coca) exactly what they are: terrorism. And so, Evo and the rest of the cocalero movement was put on notice that they can't pretend to negotiate w/ clean hands on the issue of narcotrafficking.

Meanwhile, in parliament, Evo's right-hand-man, Filemon Escobar (a MAS senator) attacked a fellow member of parliament. Escobar was upset that former cabinet members who were elected to parliament in 2002 were returning to their seats. A regular hothead (this isn't the first time he's done something like this) threw a glass at the head of Hugo Carvajal (an MNR senator). The broohaha made the front page of most papers today.

And at the main university (UMSA), the fight between sectarian groups ended yesterday w/ a Trostkyite victory after they seized the head of the student assembly (Diego Salazar), stripped him of his clothes, beat him, and forced him to read a confession of his misdeeds while blood poured from his head. Of course, Salazar today launched a formal suit for assault & battery against the Trostkyites. So the fight continues.

A group of campesinos from Warisata & Sorata have camped out in front of the Ministry of Justice, demanding that the families of those killed or wounded in the gunfight between soldiers & campesinos (who ambushed the army in October) receive indemnities, as Mesa promised. Problem: the government (which is broke) promised a sum that displeases the families. Of course, you can't put a price on a human life. But. The government can't even afford the Bs. 5,000 set aside. So. Who knows how long the campesinos will sit in front of the ministry.

At least a group of police are escorting them and keeping them from blocking the Prado. Good thing they're there, too. Because pace├▒os are so angry at protesters these days, that the poor campesinos have to hear constant whistles, taunts, and insults (such as "Why don't you ask Quispe for money?!") from passersby.

Hunger strikes "until the ultimate consequences" continue throughout the city. A recent editorial chided that this must be the most popular passtime in La Paz. If you're fired from your job, you can go on hunger strike to demand your job, the resignation of your boss, and "┬бel gas no se vende!"

It seems Mesa's finally realized he'll never befriend the populist left, no matter how hard he tries. So he's back to being a constitutional democrat, giving the middle class a huge collective sigh of relief.

In the past few weeks, Mesa & his ministers did everything in their power to appease the demands of syndicalist dirigentes like Felipe Quispe, Evo Morales, Angel Duran, Jaime Solares, Roberto de la Cruz, and others. When he offered to negotiate their myriad demands, they scoffed, insulted cabinet members, walked out of meetings, or called on the use of mobilized violence to achive their goals. Last week, Mesa found his spine.

In the end, it seems the government's decided to negotiate w/ other dirigentes who, not only are more willing to negotiate, but it seems are actually more legitimate. Bolivian papers never reported this (investigative journalism isn't a strong suit here). But. It seems Quispe's not actually head of the Confederaci├│n Syndical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB), de la Cruz doesn't lead the Central Obrera Regional de El Alto (COR), and Duran isn't chief of the Movimiento Sin Tierra (MST). While they are of course major players in these organizations (and have their own clientelistic networks w/in them), they seem to forget that these organizations have organizational structures & elections.

Is this merely a divide and conquer strategy on the part of the government? Probably. But I don't see why Mesa & his ministers, who've shown tremendous good faith in trying to negotiate can't also decide which leaders they'll negotiate w/. And if Someone from MST wants to negotiate, rather than call on campesinos to forcefully seize lands (as Duran does), I see no reason why Mesa can't negotiate w/ the actual executive secreaty of the MST. The same goes for all the other groups.

Meanwhile, the formal investigation of Goni & his ministers is going forward. But it might not make Evo & co. happy. While the courts found enough reason to try Goni & his ministers for excessive use of force in October, it also found enough reason to investigate Evo, Quispe, Solares, and five other dirigentes for crimes against the state (such as for callign on armed insurrection). Meanwhile, two sets of lawyers have also filed individual criminal suits against the populist dirigentes for their actions in October. It's gonna be an interesting legal process.

US Department of State

Press Statement
Richard Boucher, Spokesman
Washington, DC
November 17, 2003


The United States Government has completed the 2003 annual estimates of coca
cultivation in Peru and Bolivia. The estimates -- produced with survey-sampling
techniques and satellite imagery -- indicate that overall coca cultivation
levels continue to be lower for Peru and Bolivia than in the past - between
50,000 and 60,000 hectares (or 123,500 and 148,200 acres), compared to 163,900
hectares (406,470 acres) in 1995. Even with sustained eradication efforts in
Colombia there has not been an increase in cultivation in the other two major
coca cultivation countries.

In Peru, survey figures show a net 15% decrease in coca cultivation in 2003.
Overall, net coca cultivation dropped from 36,000 hectares in 2002 to 31,150
hectares in 2003. Nevertheless, cultivation in the Apurimac-Ene and Monzon
valleys -- traditional growing areas where plantation-style plots can be found
-- remained steady. These areas represent 67% of the illicit coca produced in
Peru.

In Bolivia, there was an overall increase of over 4,000 hectares (10,900 acres)
to 28,450 hectares (70,300 acres) of coca cultivation, or 17% above 2002 s
estimate. While cultivation in the Chapare region, the historic illicit coca
cultivation zone, fell by 15%, cultivation in the Yungas, grew by 26%. This is
the challenge that faces Bolivia, as coca in excess of what is needed for the
legal, traditional market ends up feeding the illegal cocaine market.

It is important to note that eradication is only part of our bilateral
counter-drug strategy in Peru and Bolivia. Together we are making major
progress in both the interdiction of drugs and providing effective alternative
development. We will continue to work with the governments of Bolivia and Peru
on the continued challenges faced to fight the production and flow of drugs.